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ABSTRACT 
Public support for foreign aid in donor countries is highly correlated with how much 
donor countries are willing to give. There is, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little 
evidence on the determinants of public support for foreign aid in donor countries.  
And the evidence that does exist is for donors that are developed democratic 
countries. In this study we examine the determinants of public support for foreign aid 
in China. China is a particularly interesting case because it is both a recipient and 
donor of foreign aid. Thus, one would expect that the public’s perceptions of China’s 
own development needs would influence its support for China donating to other 
countries. We find that while political ideology and sense of national identity are the 
most important determinants of support for foreign aid, several demographic 
characteristics are also important. We also find that those living in the lower income 
western provinces and in provinces with higher poverty rates express less support for 
giving foreign aid. We draw policy implications from the findings for better targeting 
engagement strategies designed to garner support for foreign aid. 
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1. Introduction 
A peculiar feature of foreign aid is that while it often forms a significant part of 
national income for recipient countries, it typically only constitutes a small part of the 
national income of donor countries (Chong & Gradstein, 2008). This raises the 
interesting question, why don’t donor countries give more and what determines how 
much they give? Public opinion about foreign aid in the donor country is important in 
influencing how much countries give (Stern, 1998). This suggests that studying the 
factors that determine public opinion in donor countries can contribute to a better 
understanding of foreign aid from the perspective of the donor country. 
In this study we address the question: What determines public support for foreign aid 
in China? In addressing this question we focus on China as a donor of foreign aid, 
rather than as a recipient of foreign aid.1
As a point of comparison with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in terms of 
the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) China increased from 16th in 
2001 to 6th in 2012 and 2013.
 China’s foreign aid program is relatively 
small, but it is getting bigger, growing at an annual rate of 30 percent between 2004 
and 2009 (Information Office of the State Council, 2011). In 2013 China’s foreign aid 
budget was US$6.4 billion, equivalent to 0.07 percent of the country’s GDP (Brant, 
2014). Between 2010 and 2012, China provided US$14.4 billion of aid to 121 
countries, including 51 in Africa, 30 in Asia, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
12 in Europe and 9 in Oceania (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). 
2
China’s growing foreign aid program poses a series of challenges to the existing nexus 
established by the OECD-DAC and the World Bank (Dreher & Fuchs, 2014; Dreher et 
al., 2013; Dreher et al., 2011). There has been extensive discussion on whether 
Chinese foreign aid, which allegedly does not impose political conditions on recipient 
countries, is a better alternative to western foreign aid in terms of fostering local 
capacity and good governance (Sorensen, 2010; Wang et al., 2014). Debate has 
centered on whether aid from China and other emerging donors has bolstered rogue 
states, fuelled corruption and increased the debt of poor countries (Woods, 2008).  
 China’s bilateral aid is now approaching that of France 
and its foreign aid is expected to be on a par with the top five DAC members by 2015 
(Kitano & Harada, 2014). China will also be the major financial underwriter of the 
New Development Bank, which is soon to be launched by the BRICS nations (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa), in a bid to challenge the existing institutions 
of international aid dominated by the West (The Economist, 2014).  
                                                          
1 There has been a strong debate among China’s geopolitical rivals that why aid is still being provided to a 
country that is now the world’s second largest economy (see e.g. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2011). In 2011, 
Japan provided US$800 million in development aid to China; in 2013, the United States provided US$28 million 
in development aid to China (Fish, 2013).  
2 China is not a DAC member and its aid does not easily fit into the OECD’s ODC definition. However, Kitano 
and Harada (2014) use the ODA standard to redefine Chinese aid in order to compare China and DAC members. 
See also Wolf et al. (2013) for a comparison between differing definitions of aid in the OECD and China. 
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Most existing studies on China’s foreign aid program have focused on one of three 
areas; the amount of foreign aid (e.g. Strange et al., 2014), the effectiveness of foreign 
aid (e.g. Renwick, 2014; Schiere, 2014) and the institutions underpinning the 
allocation of foreign aid (e.g. Watson, 2014; Xu et al., 2014; Xue, 2014). Recently, 
calls have been made to broaden the study of China’s foreign aid program beyond 
these areas (Bräutigam, 2011; Kitano, 2014). In particular, research is needed on 
public opinion in China, given that this is likely to be an important determinant of 
China’s foreign aid program in the future (Shimomura & Ohashi, 2013). 
A better understanding of public opinion about foreign aid is important. In 
traditional donor countries  public opinion has had a significant influence on aid 
policy through the electoral system (Lancaster, 2006; Shimomura & Ohashi, 2013). 
There is, however, little research on the extent to which the Chinese public support 
China’s foreign aid program (Shimomura & Ohashi, 2013). 
The existing evidence is piecemeal and has varied in its major conclusions. On one 
hand, a few articles have noted that segments of the Chinese public have criticized the 
Chinese government for giving foreign aid to other countries when development 
challenges remain significant within China (Branigan, 2013; Brant, 2013).3
In examining the determinants of Chinese public opinion on China’s foreign aid 
program and the extent to which the Chinese public believe that its government 
should be prioritizing domestic development vis-à-vis financing foreign aid, this 
study contributes to the existing literature on foreign aid in multiple ways.  
 Based on 
observation of online responses to China’s donation of 23 school buses to Macedonia, 
ten days after a school bus crash in Gansu province with a death toll of 19 preschool 
children, Brant (2013) asserts: ‘It is hard for the Chinese to be open about foreign aid, 
especially when they are giving it to countries that may have a GDP per capita higher 
than China’s own.’ On the other hand, a recent survey found that 46 per cent of urban 
citizens favor China providing foreign aid to developing countries (InterMedia, 2012). 
This was the second largest share among the five surveyed countries (i.e. China, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States).  
First, this study contributes to the sparse literature on public opinion about aid in 
donor countries (Milner & Tingley, 2013). There is limited research on mass attitudes 
towards aid in recipient and donor countries (Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Goldsmith 
et al., 2014; Knack & Paxton, 2008). These studies only examine donors that are 
developed countries. This study is the first to examine public opinion towards foreign 
aid in a developing country, which is both a recipient and donor of aid. 
Second, we contribute to the study of public opinion on foreign aid in an 
authoritarian regime in which there is no electoral mechanism. Existing studies have 
studied how public opinion influences foreign aid in democratic donor countries. 
                                                          
3 For instance, in 2012 nearly 99 million rural residents were still under the Chinese official poverty line (The 
Economist, 2013). In 2013 China’s Human Development Index ranked 91st of 187 countries or territories (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2014).  
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While China does not have an electoral mechanism, this is not to say that the 
government is not responsive to public opinion. In China the influence of public 
opinion on foreign policy formulation has evolved over time (Reilly, 2011). At the 
same time, the Chinese government has become increasingly consultative in making 
foreign policy (Williams, 2014) and has exhibited a willingness to cooperate with DAC 
members (Xu & Carey, 2014). However, because of limited data availability and 
political sensitivities, there are few studies of the impact of public opinion on foreign 
affairs in China. Existing limited studies on China’s foreign policy have centered on 
public opinion regarding China’s policy towards Japan (Reilly, 2011) and foreign 
countries and the impact of globalization (Lee et al., 2014).  
2. Data and method 
This study uses data from two surveys of the Chinese populace. The first dataset 
contains 1,991 respondents from the 2007 World Values Survey (WVS), which was 
administered in 23 provinces in China. 4  The second dataset contains 10,151 
respondents from the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), which was a 
nationally-representative survey, administered in 27 provinces.5
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
  
Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statistics for both surveys. In the WVS, the key 
question asked: ‘Should the Chinese government give top priority to assist reducing 
poverty in the world or to solve your own country’s problems?’ Respondents 
answered on a 10-point scale, in which 1 denoted giving top priority to solving 
domestic problems and 10 denoted giving top priority to solving the world’s problems. 
In the WVS, most respondents believed that priority should be given to addressing 
China’s domestic problems over giving to other countries (mean score: 2.70).  
In the CGSS the three key questions asked respondents whether China should expand 
its economic aid to other developing countries, expand medical aid to Africa and send 
troops to participate in United Nations peacekeeping.6
It is essential to distinguish factors potentially influencing support for foreign aid at 
the individual level from those at the aggregate level. In a large country, such as 
China, provinces vary in terms of political, economic and cultural characteristics, 
which could influence individual support for aid (Paxton & Knack, 2012). Only a few 
studies (e.g. Hudson & vanHeerde-Hudson, 2013; Paxton & Knack, 2012) consider 
 Overall, 77-85 per cent of 
respondents supported the expansion of the three types of aid. 
                                                          
4 For more details about the WVS, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
5 See Bian and Li (2012) for details on sample design, data collection and quality control in the CGSS. 
6 Medical aid is an important part of China’s foreign aid program (Liu et al., 2014). From 2010-2012, China 
dispatched 55 medical teams, comprising 3,600 medical personnel to 54 countries, treating nearly seven million 
patients (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). In 2013 China dispatched 2193 personnel (173 police, 
37 military experts, and 1993 troops) to UN peacekeeping; China’s rank in the contribution to UN peacekeeping 
jumped from 46th in 2000 to 14th as of June 2014 among 123 contributors (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014). 
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the hierarchical structure of determinants of support for aid, even though such need 
is explicitly emphasized (Prather, 2011). 
We employ a multi-level mixed (MLM) model containing both fixed and random 
effects. It specifically takes into account that respondents are selected in different 
provinces with different levels of socioeconomic development. Following the existing 
literature (e.g. Steenbergen & Jones, 2002), the level-1 model is in the form of: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                                               (1) 
 
where yij is the dependent variable for an individual i (= 1,…, Ni) nested in a province j 
(= 1,…, Jj); xij is the level-1 vector of independent variables (e.g. characteristics and 
attitudes of the individual); and εij is a level-1 disturbance term. The fixed effects at 
level-1 units are analogous to standard regression coefficients. The random effects of 
regression parameters vary across level-2 units (i.e. provinces). Therefore the 
variation of level-1 parameters can be modeled as a function of level-2 predictors: 
 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿0𝑗                                                                                                              (2) 
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿1𝑗                                                                                                               (3) 
 
where the γ-parameters are the fixed level-2 parameters and zij denotes a vector of 
level-2 predictor for an individual i; and the δ-parameters are disturbances, implying 
that the level-2 predictors are not assumed to account perfectly for the variation in 
the level-1 parameters. The level-1 model (equation 1) and level 2 model (equations 2 
and 3) can be combined into a single equation. This can be represented as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = �𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿0𝑗� + �𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿1𝑗�𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗       = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾11𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿0𝑗 + 𝛿1𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                    (4) 
 
where γ00 is the constant; γ01 is the effect of the level-2 predictor; γ10 is the level-1 
predictor; and γ11 is the effect of cross level interaction between level-1 and level-2 
predictors; among the random parameters, δ0j is the residual level-2 variation in the 
level-1 intercept that remains after controlling for zij, δ1j is the residual level-2 
variation in the level-1 slope for xij after controlling for zij, and εij is the level-1 
disturbance. The level-2 predictors include provincial data on population size, gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita, 
average annual GDP growth rate over the past five years, poverty rate and whether 
the province is eligible to receive domestic aid and transfers under the Western 
Development Program.7
                                                          
7 Statistics on population size, GDP, FDI and average growth rate are obtained and calculated from the China 
Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007); the poverty rate is calculated from the CGSS 
data using a relative poverty line (20 per cent of provincial median income). Western region includes Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunan, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. 
 These factors matters for public support for domestic and 
international policies (Ali et al., 2014; Mahler et al., 2000; Paxton & Knack, 2012). 
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3. What explains public support for giving foreign aid? 
Previous research suggests that public support for foreign aid is influenced by 
political, religious and social participation and views; trust in government and other 
state institutions; satisfaction with one’s lot in life and financial status; social status; 
trust in others and demographic characteristics in level-1; as well an array of 
provincial/state level characteristics in level-2. In this section, we consider each of 
these factors in turn and discuss the measurement of some key constructs.  
Political, Religious and Social Participation and Views 
We examine several variables related to religious, social and political participation 
and views. Participation in political and social organizations is likely to be at least 
partly motivated by altruistic considerations. Such individuals are likely to be more 
community minded and this is likely to be motivated by a desire to assist others 
(Paxton & Knack, 2012). Being religious is also likely to be positively correlated with 
altruism, philanthropy and trust. Most religions promote a compassionate outlook 
toward others and encourage empathy toward those less fortunate (Paxton & Knack, 
2012). The WVS contains a response: ‘People in society treat me fairly’. Based on 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), we expect that people who perceive that others 
threat them fairly are likely to reciprocate and feel altruistic toward others. Such 
people, consequently, are more likely to support foreign aid. 
Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson (2013, p.3) suggest that ‘as a policy issue, 
development aid is characterized by low salience, low knowledge and strong opinions’. 
The notion of low-information rationality suggests that ‘citizens use information 
shortcuts to form opinions on politics even when they lack expert knowledge’ (Paxton 
& Knack, 2012, p. 174). If individuals feel that the poor are lazy, or can easily escape 
poverty, then they are unlikely to support aid (Paxton & Knack, 2012). In the CGSS, 
we use several measures of attitudes towards poverty; namely, the poor lack adequate 
education, people are in poverty because they are lazy, the government is responsible 
for poverty and the government should tax the rich to help the poor. If people 
perceive that the poor are lazy or do not want to work they will oppose foreign aid on 
the basis that either the poor cannot be helped or are undeserving of assistance. 
However, if people believe that the poor lack human capital, this can be addressed by 
expenditure on education and they will support foreign aid.  
People’s positions on the left–right political spectrum, and their attitudes about the 
poor in general, can help predict their attitudes about the provision of foreign aid. 
Foreign aid represents a form of government intervention in the international 
marketplace. Thus, in western countries conservatives are typically opposed to 
economic aid. However, it is important to realize that the left-right political spectrum 
has a different interpretation in China than in western countries. Relatively speaking, 
leftists/conservatives tend to uphold Maoist ideals, be more egalitarian and support 
nationalism, while opposing globalization and western-style democracy. Meanwhile, 
rightists/liberals tend to oppose government interference, embrace western culture, 
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agitate for universal values of human rights and freedoms and support the 
introduction of representative democracy (Carter, 2010).  
We expect that the more conservative one is in China, the more supportive of foreign 
aid one should be because foreign aid promotes socialist ideals of support for the less 
well-off and is often used to further nationalist/strategic interests (as in foreign aid to 
Africa since the Maoist era). Giving foreign aid may also improve the image of the 
donor (Goldsmith et al., 2014), which may appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of 
conservatives in China. The corollary is that more liberal one is, the less supportive of 
foreign aid one can be expected to be because in an authoritarian state, like China, 
the foreign aid program lacks transparency and accountability. As a consequence, 
liberals see it as potentially fueling corruption and abuse of funds. 
The WVS contains questions on whether taxing the rich to help the poor is an 
essential characteristic of democracy, whether China’s needs a democratic system and 
the importance of democracy to China. Higher scores on answers to these questions 
indicate more liberal attitudes. The specifications with the CGSS use variables based 
on a principal components analysis of questions that capture the political ideology 
dimension of the left-right scale. We constructed a variable of factor scores for 
respondents’ support for fighting for self-interest through public gatherings, 
marching and protesting, striking and petitioning (xinfang). With the exception of 
strikes, these rights are legally recognized in China, but the government views them 
as disruptive (King et al., 2013, 2014; Li et al., 2012). A higher factor score indicates a 
more conservative attitude toward challenging the state and expressing self-interest 
through these activities. Drawing this discussion together, we expect that those who 
are more conservative, and more nationalistic, will be more supportive of foreign aid. 
Attitudes towards Institutions 
Trust in government has been used to predict foreign aid preferences (Chong & 
Gradstein, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2008; Paxton & Knack, 2012; Prather, 2011). 
Based on the political legitimacy theory, those who have trust in governments, 
authorities, institutions and social arrangements can be expected to be more 
supportive of any government activity (Ali et al., 2014; Tyler, 2006). Hetherington 
and Globetti (2002) suggest that having trust in government is particularly important 
for supporting policies that involve allocation of funds to others, such as foreign aid. 
In China, state institutions include not only government, but also include the print 
media, television and other state-controlled media. The WVS contains a variable on 
who should be responsible for deciding foreign aid between governments of nation 
states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Those that believe governments 
of nation states should decide foreign aid are more likely to support foreign aid. 
For the analysis using the CGSS, we constructed three factor score variables denoting 
trust towards the government, state-controlled central media and private sources of 
information, with higher scores indicating higher level of trust. Because the specific 
forms of aid are closely identified with China’s reputation or identity (e.g. helping 
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African friends or assisting United Nations peacekeeping), higher levels of trust 
towards state institutions can be expected to have a positive correlation with support 
for aid. Therefore, we expect that those with higher trust in state-controlled media 
and the government are more likely to support aid because they are more supportive 
of state institutions, and that those with more trust in private sources of information 
have less trust in state institutions and are less likely to support aid.  
Subjective Indicators 
Following existing studies (Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2008; 
Paxton & Knack, 2012; Prather, 2011), we also control for a set of subjective 
indicators. These include: one’s trust towards other people (in the WVS only), 
satisfaction with one’s financial situation, satisfaction with one’s life and self-
perceived social class. Generosity towards others increases with trust (Bekkers, 2007). 
Trust and satisfaction with one’s financial situation and satisfaction with one’s life are 
linked to altruism and have been found to be positively correlated with support for 
foreign aid (Paxton & Knack, 2012). In addition, existing studies for developed 
countries suggest that individuals from higher social classes should support foreign 
aid on the assumption that they are better placed to reap the benefits from foreign 
outreach (Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2008; Prather, 2011). 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Finally, we control for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, which are 
likely to be related to preferences for altruism and economic self-interest. These 
characteristics include age, gender, having a child, health, education and income.  
Some research suggests that younger people tend to be more supportive of foreign aid 
(Paxton & Knack, 2012; Prather, 2011; van Heerde & Hudson, 2010). However, these 
studies treat support for foreign aid as a linear function of age and do not test 
whether there is a U-shaped relationship between age and support for foreign aid. 
There is some evidence that older people are more likely to support charitable causes. 
For instance, a study on adult age-related differences in altruism finds that older 
adults were more likely to donate money to a good cause, to report valuing 
contributions to the public good and to behave altruistically compared with younger 
and middle-aged adults (Freund & Blanchard-Fields, 2014). We expect that support 
for foreign aid will be non-linear; ie. higher among younger and older people. 
We expect there to be gender differences in support for foreign aid. Specifically, we 
expect that women will be more supportive of foreign aid than men. Women tend to 
be more altruistic than men because women are socialized to take care of one another 
(Paxton & Knack, 2012). Men are mainly socialized to be in competition with each 
other (Dietz et al., 2002). In the United States, women have been found to be more 
‘liberal’ than men (Edlund & Pande, 2002). Individuals with liberal values (in a 
western democratic sense) are more likely to support foreign aid. 
 9 
 
The effect of having a child on support for foreign aid is unclear. On the one hand, it 
may be that having a child broadens one’s perspective, engendering empathy toward 
others and, thus, by extension, support for foreign aid (Paxton & Knack, 2012). There 
might be spillover effects from child to parent if the parent learns more about 
development needs overseas through de facto exposure to the child’s curriculum 
(Henson & Lindstrom, 2013). On the other hand, from the perspective of economic 
self-interest, parents may feel that their government should allocate more resources 
to their children’s future rather than on foreign aid (Knack & Paxton, 2008).  
The effects of health, income and human capital endowment on support for foreign 
aid are also uncertain. On the one hand, those who have higher incomes, might be 
more flexible in their attitude toward risk taking and this might encourage altruism 
(Paxton & Knack, 2012). Those who are better educated are more likely to hold 
progressive views on social issues and be more international in outlook (Hudson & 
vanHeerde-Hudson, 2013), both of which are likely to be correlated with increased 
support for foreign aid. Research suggests that altruistic emotions and behaviors are 
associated with better health (Post, 2005). Therefore, people with better health might 
be more likely to support foreign aid. On the other hand, there may be a negative 
relationship between the economic endowment variables and foreign economic aid. 
Education, health status and income are correlated. Individuals with better health, 
higher education and income pay a greater share of taxes and, thus, may be less 
enthusiastic about giving aid to foreign countries (Prather, 2011). 
Provincial Characteristics 
We expect that provinces with a larger population are more likely to support aid 
because of better information flow, which may lead to greater exposure to 
international affairs.  
Provincial GDP, FDI per capita and annual growth rate are included as measures of 
aggregate level economic conditions, openness and exposure to foreign affairs. 
Similar to the effect of income at the individual level, the directions of their effects are 
uncertain.  
To address the increasing disparities between eastern and western regions and the 
discontentment of western provinces towards poverty and unbalanced regional 
development, in 2000 the Chinese government initiated the Western Development 
Program, which has provided preferential policies for economic development and 
massive funding for infrastructure, environment protection, human capital and social 
welfare (Lai, 2002). The program may have helped reduce regional disparities and 
poverty, but they remain pronounced (Xie & Zhou, 2014). In the first ten years of the 
program more than US$325 billion were invested on projects, and in recent years the 
Chinese government continues to invest more than US$50 billion per year on new 
projects in the western region (Edwards, 2012). It is anticipated that people from 
western provinces, or provinces with higher poverty rates, are less likely to support 
foreign aid while their own needs for development support remains very strong. 
 10 
 
5. Results 
Results from the WVS 
Table 3 presents the results from the WVS using two-level linear mixed models with 
fixed effects at the individual level and random effects at the provincial level. The 
interclass correlation (ICC) demonstrates that about 7 per cent of the total variance in 
the support for prioritizing international poverty reduction can be attributed to 
between-province differences. In each of the four specifications, the likelihood ratio 
tests for the mixed model against a single-level linear regression indicate that the 
mixed model with province random effects at level-2 perform better than the single-
level regression model. 
[Table 3 here] 
Our analysis focuses on Model 4, which contains a full set of variables and has the 
smallest Akaike information criterion (AIC) value, indicating that it has relatively 
better fit. Among the demographic and socioeconomic indicators, individual support 
for foreign aid exhibits a non-linear U-shaped relationship in which support bottoms 
out at 45 years of age. Men are less likely to support foreign aid than women. The 
coefficient on having a child is statistically insignificant. The findings for the 
endowment variables are mixed. We find no significant relationship between health 
or education and support for foreign aid. We find a negative relationship between 
income and support for foreign aid, which is consistent across all four models. A one-
unit increase in the income decile decreases support for foreign aid by 0.127 points.  
Among the subjective indicators, we find that the coefficients on trusting others and 
satisfaction with one’s financial position are statistically insignificant, while support 
for aid decreases by 0.281 points for each one unit increase in level of life satisfaction. 
The coefficient on life satisfaction, however, is only weakly significant.  Support for 
foreign aid increases by 0.217 points for each one-unit increase in social class.  
Among the different types of participation in organizations, we find that political and 
religious participation increases support for foreign aid. The magnitude of the effect 
of religious participation (0.390 points) and political participation (0.327 points) are 
relatively large. However, other forms of community and sports participation are 
statistically insignificant. Among the variables denoting socio-political views, those 
who perceive that others treat them fairly are less likely to support foreign aid, 
although the coefficient is only weakly significant. Those who are more 
rightist/liberal (i.e. regard taxing the rich to support the poor as an essential 
characteristic of democracy; that China needs a democratic system and perceive 
democracy to be important) are less supportive of aid. Those have higher trust of the 
print media are less likely to support aid. However, those with more trust of 
television are more likely to support aid. Compared with individual governments, 
those who believe that the United Nations should decide aid are less likely to support 
the Chinese government prioritizing international development.  
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The parameters at level-2 indicate that the effects of population size, GDP per capita 
and FDI per capita on support for foreign aid are statistically insignificant. 
Meanwhile, the annual growth rate has a positive effect while the poverty rate and 
living in a western province has a negative effect on support for foreign aid. 
Results from the CGSS 
Models 1-3 in Table 4 present the results from the CGSS using logit two-level mixed 
models for three types of aid (economic aid, medical aid to Africa and UN 
peacekeeping). Model 4 presents the results using a Poisson two-level mixed model, 
in which the dependent variable is the number of foreign aid types that the 
respondent supports. The ICCs of models 1-3 show that approximately 4 per cent of 
total variance in the support for foreign aid can be attributed to between-province 
differences. The likelihood ratio tests show that all mixed models perform better than 
single-level models. 
[Table 4 here] 
The variables denoting demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are largely 
insignificant across Models 1-4. In Model 3, men are more likely than women to 
support participation in UN peacekeeping. This result is not totally unexpected. 
Women tend to be less militaristic and more opposed to spending on war or military 
conflicts overseas compared with men (Greeno & Maccoby, 1993). Findings for the 
United States suggest that men are more likely to support foreign spending on the 
military than women, while women are more likely than men to support foreign 
spending on humanitarian causes (Milner & Tingley, 2013).  
There are mixed results for the effect of endowments on public support for foreign aid. 
Health is statistically insignificant in Models 1, 2 and 4 and has a weakly positive 
effect on support for participation in United Nations peacekeeping in Model 3. 
Consistent with the WVS results, income has a negative effect on support for 
economic aid in Model 1, but is statistically insignificant in the other three models.  
There are strong effects of education in Models 1 and 2. Compared to those with no 
qualifications, all other groups except those with a postgraduate degree are more 
likely to support economic aid and medical aid to Africa.  
Among the subjective indicators, Models 1, 2 and 4 suggest that people who are more 
satisfied with their lives are more likely to support economic aid, medical aid to 
Africa and are more likely to support multiple aid types. Model 3 suggests that the 
people with higher self-perceived social class are more likely to support participation 
in United Nations peacekeeping, consistent with expectations. The coefficient on 
satisfaction with one’s financial situation is insignificant in each model.  
The effects of political and religious participation are largely insignificant. With the 
exception of Buddhism, being religious has no effect on support for foreign aid.  
Compared to Communist Party members, members of the Communist Youth League 
and those without political affiliation are more likely to support medical aid to Africa 
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(Model 2). Respondents who expressed the view that the poor lack adequate 
education are more likely to support aid in Models 1-3, while those who believed the 
poor do not want to work are less likely to support UN peacekeeping in Model 3. 
Believing government is responsible for poverty has statistically positive effects on 
support for medical aid and UN peacekeeping. Believing that the government should 
tax the rich has a statistically significant positive effect on support for aid in Models 
1-4. Disapproval of expression of self-interest also has a statistically significant 
positive effect on support for each type of aid in Models 1-3 as well as Model 4.   
In terms of attitudes towards institutions, the coefficients on having trust in 
government and trusting private sources of information have unexpected signs in 
Model 2 and Model 1 respectively, but are only weakly significant. Trust in state-
controlled central media and beliefs that one should follow the government and 
support one’s country have a positive effect on support for aid across all models.  
Among the level-2 variables, population size is insignificant in all models, GDP per 
capita has a negative effect on support for aid in Models 1 and 2 and FDI per capita 
has a negative effect on support for economic aid in Model 1. These findings are 
consistent with the negative effect of personal income on support for aid at the 
individual level. In other words, in the aggregate, richer provinces do not exhibit 
greater support for foreign aid. Given that we control for respondents’ own income 
levels and subjective indictors (including satisfaction with finance), these results 
imply that respondents living in wealthier provinces opposing foreign aid in favor of 
domestic redistribution (Paxton & Knack, 2012). Meanwhile, faster growing 
provinces are more likely to support all three types of aid. Similar to the WVS results, 
the poverty rate has a negative effect in all models, while living in a western province 
has a negative effect on support for economic and medical aid. 
6.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The results in this paper break new ground in the sense that they present the first 
evidence on the determinants of public support for aid in a developing country that is 
both a recipient and a donor of foreign aid as well as the first evidence on the 
determinants of public support for aid in an authoritarian regime. The Chinese case is 
particularly interesting given the ongoing debate in that country about the extent to 
which China should be giving aid to other countries, many of which have higher GDP 
per capita than China, at a time when China faces considerable development 
challenges. 
This study applies a hierarchical model, in which both individual and provincial 
characteristics are included in the analysis. Across the two datasets our results 
suggest that a complex array of factors determine public support for foreign aid. 
Debate has centered on the extent to which demographic characteristics versus 
sociopolitical views determine support for foreign aid (Henson & Lindstrom, 2013). 
Our results suggest that one’s political ideology and sense of national identity are the 
most important determinants of public support for aid in China. However, 
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demographic characteristics (gender, education, age and income) were also 
important in at least some of the specifications. We also find that those living in the 
relatively economic-disadvantaged western provinces and in provinces with higher 
poverty rates express less support for giving foreign aid.  
While care must be taken in drawing conclusions from this study for donor countries 
more generally, the results suggest some important policy implications. The first is 
that there may be better payoffs in targeting engagement activities at specific 
demographic segments.  The second is that an important predictor of public support 
is whether individuals trust the government and, hence, public perception of how 
effective the government is in terms of ensuring the aid is well spent is an important 
factor influencing public opinion. This suggests that much can be gained by a 
communications strategy that demonstrates aid is effective. The third is that 
campaigns promoting foreign aid should not only ‘sell’ the effectiveness of such aid, 
but also play on the value to the donor in terms of enhancing its national reputation.         
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of 2007 World Values Survey 
Note: all variables in scales are measured from low to high.
Should the Chinese leaders give top priority to help reducing poverty in the world 
or to solve your own country's problems?   
Scale:1-10 (1: top priority to solve my own country's problems; 10: top priority to help 
reducing poverty in the world) 
 
Mean 2.7 
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics  
Age 44.7 
Male (%) 45.6 
Have child (%) 87.8 
Health (scale: 1-4) 2.8 
Qualification (%)  
   Less than primary school 26.2 
   Primary school 26.3 
   Junior high school 29.0 
   Senior high school 12.2 
   Graduate diploma/bachelor 6.1 
   Postgraduate 0.2 
Personal income decile (scale: 1-10) 4.0 
Subjective indicators  
Trust other people (%) 52.4 
Finance satisfaction (scale: 1-10) 5.9 
Life satisfaction (scale: 1-4) 2.9 
Social class (scale: 1-5) 2.3 
Religious, social and political participation   
Church or religious organization (%) 12.9 
Sports or recreational organization (%) 23.1 
Art, music or educational organization (%) 20.2 
Political party (%) 18.4 
Environmental organization (%) 14.6 
Charitable or humanitarian organization (%) 11.4 
Social and political views  
People in society treat me fairly (scale: 1-10) 7.4 
Government should tax the rich to help the poor (scale: 1-10) 7.6 
China needs a democratic system (scale: 1-4) 3.3 
Importance of democracy (scale: 1-10) 8.6 
Attitudes toward institutions  
Trust central government (scale: 1-4) 3.3 
Trust print media (scale: 1-4) 2.8 
Trust television (scale: 1-4) 2.9 
Who should decide aid to developing countries? (%)  
   Individual governments 32.2 
   Regional organization 11.8 
   The United Nations 56.0 
Provinces/municipalities: Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Yunan, Shaanxi, Xijiang, Ningxia 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of 2006 Chinese General Social Survey 
Economic aid: China should expand its economic aid to other developing countries (%) 77.1 
Medical aid: China should provide more medical aid to African countries (%) 83.2 
Military aid: China should participate in the United Nations Peacekeeping (%) 84.9 
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics  
Age 42.7 
Male (%) 46.2 
Have child (%) 55.7 
Health (scale: 1-4) 2.1 
Qualification (%)  
   Less than primary school 7.6 
   Primary school 22.3 
   Junior high school 33.2 
   Senior high school 22.6 
   Graduate diploma/bachelor 11.8 
   Postgraduate 2.5 
Personal income decile (scale: 1-10) 5.4 
Residence (%)  
   Inner city 52.5 
   Towns 5.7 
   Suburbs 0.9 
   Villages 40.7 
   Others 0.2 
Subjective indicators  
Finance satisfaction (scale: 1-3) 2.4 
Life satisfaction (scale: 1-5) 3.4 
Social class (scale: 1-5) 1.9 
Religious and political participation  
Religion (%)  
  Non-religious 86.7 
  Buddhism 7.4 
  Daoism 0.2 
  Chinese popular religions 1.9 
  Islam  1.5 
  Catholic 0.3 
  Protestant 1.7 
  Others 0.3 
Party membership (%)  
   Chinese Communist Party 8.8 
   Democratic parties 0.1 
   Communist Youth League 6.3 
   None 84.8 
Social and political views  
Disapproval of expression of self-interest (factor score) 1.44e-09 
The poor lack adequate education (scale: 1-4) 2.7 
The poor are lazy  (scale: 1-4) 2.2 
Government is responsible for poverty (scale: 1-4) 2.6 
Government should tax the rich to help the poor (scale: 1-4) 3.1 
Attitudes toward institutions  
Trust government (factor score) 5.43e-09 
Trust state-controlled central media (factor score) 1.63e-09 
Trust private sources of information (factor score) -4.96e-09 
Should always follow government (scale: 1-4) 2.7 
Should always support my country (scale: 1-4) 2.9 
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Note: all variables in scales are measured from low to high.
Provinces/municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Xinjiang 
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Table 3 Correlates of Domestic vis-à-vis International Development Priority, 2007 World Values Survey (linear multilevel mixed model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Level-1: Fixed effects parameters     
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics        
Age -0.0991*** (-2.71) -0.0628* (-1.65) -0.0767* (-1.83) -0.103** (-2.14) 
Age squared 0.000943** (2.43) 0.000598 (1.48) 0.000790* (1.77) 0.00112** (2.19) 
Male -0.261* (-1.94) -0.293** (-2.13) -0.341** (-2.26) -0.393** (-2.28) 
Have child -0.310 (-1.22) -0.443* (-1.67) -0.265 (-0.95) -0.140 (-0.44) 
Health -0.170** (-2.41) -0.167** (-2.12) -0.0744 (-0.84) -0.0577 (-0.55) 
Qualification (ref: less than primary school)      
   Primary school 0.384* (1.95) 0.238 (1.17) 0.285 (1.13) 0.314 (0.96) 
   Junior high school 0.0585 (0.29) 0.0757 (0.36) 0.364 (1.45) 0.330 (1.03) 
   Senior high school 0.0243 (0.10) -0.0644 (-0.26) 0.212 (0.75) 0.259 (0.74) 
   Graduate diploma/bachelor 0.128 (0.42) 0.00559 (0.02) 0.182 (0.53) 0.323 (0.78) 
   Postgraduate 0.613 (0.51) 0.0653 (0.05) 0.0962 (0.08) 0.0403 (0.03) 
Personal income decile -0.0781** (-2.06) -0.0894* (-1.89) -0.140*** (-2.70) -0.127** (-2.11) 
Subjective indicators         
Trust other people   0.295** (2.20) 0.159 (1.05) 0.161 (0.90) 
Finance satisfaction   0.00668 (0.22) 0.000684 (0.02) -0.00819 (-0.20) 
Life satisfaction   -0.161 (-1.44) -0.238* (-1.86) -0.281* (-1.84) 
Social class   0.158 (1.63) 0.174 (1.61) 0.217* (1.73) 
Religious, social and political participation         
Church or religious organization     0.331* (1.79) 0.390* (1.85) 
Sports or recreational organization     -0.0855 (-0.60) -0.0643 (-0.42) 
Art, music or educational organization     0.149 (0.94) 0.162 (0.96) 
Political parties     0.285** (2.12) 0.327** (2.23) 
Environmental organization     0.162 (0.76) 0.105 (0.47) 
Charitable or humanitarian organization     -0.0758 (-0.33) -0.0908 (-0.38) 
Social and political views         
People in the society treat me fairly     -0.0608* (-1.72) -0.0731* (-1.75) 
Taxing the rich to help the poor is essential in democracy    -0.0651** (-2.42) -0.0746** (-2.29) 
China needs a democratic system     -0.365*** (-2.89) -0.0239** (-2.15) 
Importance of democracy     -0.139*** (-3.04) -0.191*** (-3.64) 
Attitudes towards institutions         
Trust central government       -0.0250 (-0.16) 
Trust print media       -0.510*** (-2.79) 
Trust television       0.647*** (3.31) 
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Who should decide aid to developing countries? (ref: individual governments)       
   Regional organization       -0.0758 (-0.26) 
   The United Nations       -0.375** (-1.97) 
Constant 6.137*** (7.83) 5.427*** (6.43) 8.634*** (8.11) 8.334*** (6.44) 
Level-1: N 1360  1234  813  627  
Level-2: Random effects parameters         
Population (million) 0.000267 (0.86) 0.000247 (0.83) 0.000347 (0.56) 0.000367 (0.76) 
GDP per capita (RMB) -0.00531 (-0.67) -0.00620 (-0.47) -0.00510 (-0.67) -0.00631 (-0.57) 
FDI per capita (RMB) 0.00624 (0.68) 0.00574 (0.88) 0.00621 (0.68) 0.00524 (0.68) 
Annual growth rate (per cent) 0.0132* (1.73) 0.0122* (1.61) 0.00920* (1.83) 0.0121* (1.80) 
Poverty rate (per cent) -0.00216* (-1.82) -0.00200* (-1.73) -0.00198* (-1.72) -0.00199* (-1.70) 
Western province -0.0151* (-1.62) -0.0131* (-1.43) -0.0140* (-1.65) -0.0156* (-1.74) 
Level-2: N 23  23  23  23  
Likelihood ratio test vs. single-level linear regression 
(Prob>=chibar2) 
0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.0387 ** 0.0304 ** 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 6230.700  5603.874  3534.194  2755.428  
Notes: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 Correlates of Support for Foreign Aid, 2006 Chinese General Social Surveys (multilevel mixed model) 
 Model 1  
(logit regression) 
Model 2  
(logit regression) 
Model 3 
(logit regression) 
Model 4 
(Poisson regression) 
 Economic aid Medical aid to Africa UN Peacekeeping Count of supported items 
Level-1: Fixed effects parameters       
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics       
Age  -0.0102 (-0.58) 0.0151 (0.77) 0.00381 (0.19) 0.00194 (0.42) 
Age squared 0.000183 (0.94) -0.000110 (-0.51) 0.0000417 (0.18) -0.0000105 (-0.21) 
Male -0.0105 (-0.15) 0.0138 (0.18) 0.141* (1.73) 0.0105 (0.57) 
Have child -0.0494 (-0.67) 0.0266 (0.32) -0.0678 (-0.77) -0.00834 (-0.43) 
Health 0.0116 (0.23) 0.00674 (0.12) 0.112* (1.86) 0.00872 (-0.64) 
Qualification (ref: less than primary school)      
   Primary school 0.445*** (3.25) 0.408*** (2.77) 0.0226 (0.15) 0.0528 (1.43) 
   Junior high school 0.419*** (3.04) 0.412*** (2.75) 0.139 (0.87) 0.0557 (1.48) 
   Senior high school 0.464*** (3.02) 0.527*** (3.12) 0.151 (0.85) 0.0623 (1.50) 
   Graduate diploma/bachelor 0.421** (2.35) 0.610*** (3.03) 0.142 (0.67) 0.0576 (1.18) 
   Postgraduate -0.464 (-0.72) 0.604 (0.72) 0.422 (0.39) -0.0232 (-0.12) 
Personal income decile -0.0289** (-2.06) -0.00898 (-0.56) -0.00122 (-0.07) -0.00319 (-0.85) 
Residence (ref: inner city)         
   Towns 0.256* (1.71) 0.424** (2.41) 0.0535 (0.31) 0.0350 (0.88) 
   Suburban areas -1.114*** (-2.94) -2.072*** (-5.35) 2.036*** (2.68) -0.333*** (-2.59) 
   Villages 0.341*** (3.86) 0.225** (2.26) 0.0891 (0.87) 0.0401* (1.77) 
   Others 1.334 (1.27) 16.37 (0.01) -0.0961 (-0.09) 0.112 (0.71) 
Subjective indicators         
Finance satisfaction 0.0297 (0.55) -0.0580 (-0.94) -0.0235 (-0.37) 0.00114 (0.08) 
Life satisfaction 0.175*** (3.43) 0.160*** (2.77) 0.0223 (0.37) 0.0230* (1.74) 
Social class -0.00766 (-0.18) -0.000166 (-0.00) 0.117** (2.33) 0.00452 (0.41) 
Religious and political participation         
Religion (ref: non-religious)         
  Buddhism -0.245** (-1.98) -0.210 (-1.50) -0.507*** (-3.72) -0.0660* (-1.86) 
  Daoism 1.263 (1.19) 15.95 (0.01) -0.0959 (-0.12) 0.151 (0.82) 
  Chinese popular religions 0.173 (0.59) -0.198 (-0.66) 0.124 (0.36) -0.0180 (-0.22) 
  Islam  0.308 (0.93) -0.394 (-1.24) -0.358 (-1.06) -0.0442 (-0.54) 
  Catholic -0.0779 (-0.11) -1.086 (-1.59) -0.927 (-1.35) -0.202 (-0.88) 
  Protestant 0.143 (0.52) -0.0668 (-0.23) -0.403 (-1.47) -0.0193 (-0.28) 
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  Others 0.273 (0.34) -0.427 (-0.52) -0.969 (-1.34) -0.0513 (-0.24) 
Party membership (ref: Chinese Communist Party)        
   Democratic parties 0.170 (0.14) -1.465 (-1.13) 12.96 (0.03) -0.0236 (-0.06) 
   Communist Youth League 0.0754 (0.42) 0.399** (1.98) 0.138 (0.67) 0.0223 (0.45) 
   None 0.0712 (0.62) 0.278** (2.19) 0.144 (1.06) 0.0247 (0.80) 
Social and political views         
Disapproval of expression of self-interest 0.0885*** (2.66) 0.112*** (2.90) 0.0746* (1.82) 0.0189** (2.10) 
The poor lack adequate education 0.117*** (2.84) 0.249*** (5.34) 0.147*** (2.96) 0.0293*** (2.67) 
The poor are lazy 0.0583 (1.46) -0.0286 (-0.63) -0.114** (-2.41) -0.00393 (-0.38) 
Government is responsible for poverty 0.0202 (0.43) 0.138*** (2.62) 0.219*** (4.04) 0.0194 (1.55) 
Government should tax the rich to help the poor 0.152*** (3.42) 0.165*** (3.29) 0.295*** (5.69) 0.0317*** (2.64) 
Attitudes towards institutions         
Trust government 0.0691 (1.51) -0.0899* (-1.71) -0.00168 (-0.03) -0.0000476 (-0.00) 
Trust state-controlled central media 0.125*** (2.79) 0.283*** (5.62) 0.251*** (4.83) 0.0357*** (2.99) 
Trust private source of information 0.0655* (1.86) -0.0230 (-0.57) -0.0735* (-1.77) -0.00305 (-0.33) 
Should always follow government 0.235*** (5.24) 0.145*** (2.90) 0.184*** (3.53) 0.0304** (2.54) 
Should always support my country 0.333*** (7.28) 0.466*** (9.05) 0.399*** (7.48) 0.0749*** (6.02) 
Constant -2.303*** (-4.40) -3.059*** (-5.20) -2.552*** (-4.15) 0.157 (1.11) 
Level-1: N 6019  6089  5990  5691  
Level-2: Random effects parameters         
Population (million) 0.0000121 (0.77) 0.0000131 (0.37) 0.0000142 (0.35) 0.00000912 (0.62) 
GDP per capita (RMB) -0.00553** (-2.85) -0.00263** (-2.33) -0.00467 (-0.26) -0.000233 (-0.23) 
FDI per capita (RMB) 0.00724* (1.68) 0.00424 (0.12) 0.00332 (0.11) 0.000432 (0.22) 
Annual growth rate (per cent) 0.0290* (1.73) 0.0167* (1.67) 0.0189* (1.73) 0.00187 (0.63) 
Poverty rate (per cent) -0.00326* (-1.82) -0.00232* (-1.90) -0.00178* (-1.89) -0.000786 (-0.72) 
Western province -0.0231** (-2.61) -0.0171** (-2.45) -0.0110 (-0.91) -0.00171 (-0.61) 
Level-2: N 27  27  27  27  
Likelihood ratio test vs. single-level linear 
regression (Prob>=chibar2) 
0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.00260 *** 
Notes: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
